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CASE COMMENTS

doubt among the members of the bench and bar of West Virginia
as to the state of the law with respect to the validity of special acts,
when a general law, dealing at least partially with the subject
of the special law, already exists.
James Edward Seibert

Sentence and PunishmentHarsher Penalties Following Habeas Corpus Relief
D was indicted and pleaded guilty to two separate counts of
attempted armed robbery and received two concurrent ten year
prison terms. After exhausting his state remedies, D received
habeas corpus relief from a federal district court, and his case
was remanded for a new trial. In the second trial before a different
judge, D's case was submitted to two different juries on the
separate felony charges. D was found guilty on both charges, and
the sentencing judge gave two fifteen year terms which were to
run consecutively. D petitioned the West Virginia Supreme Court
of Appeals for a writ of habeas corpus. The petition was denied
without hearing. D then petitioned the United States District Court
for federal habeas corpus. Held, petition denied. The authority
of the sentencing judge must not be curtailed so long as the harsher
sentence imposed is not the product of retributive intent on the
part of the second sentencing judge. Shear v. Boles, 263 F. Supp.
855 (N.D. W. Va. 1967).
The recent expansion of constitutional limits on state criminal
proceedings' has created difficult problems for the federal habeas
corpus court. A major task confronting the court is to reconcile
the broadly principled demands of the United States Constitution
with the practical aspects of post-conviction relief. That is, in addition to protecting the individual's constitutional rights, a federal
court must extend such protection within the existing judicial
system. In the principal case, fearing a usurpation of the trial
court's function, the Shear court upheld the imposition of a harsher
sentence on the successful habeas corpus applicant.
I See, e.g., Griffin v. California, 380 U.S. 609 (1965) (privilege against
self-incrimination); Excobedo v. Illinois, 378 U.S. 478 (1964); Gideon v.
Wainwrigbt, 372 U.S. 335 (1963); Douglas v. California, 372 U.S. 353 (1963)
(right to counsel at all stages of litigation); Griffin v. Illinois, 351 U.S. 12
1956). (right to transcript on appeal).
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Traditionally, certain related legal theories have been employed
to obviate a petitioner's contention that a harsher penalty should
not be imposed after a second trial for the same offense. A typical
example is the so called waiver doctrine. According to this doctrine, one who voluntarily contests the first trial and conviction
waives any benefits of that trial, including the particular sentence
previously imposed.' Thus, having elected to have his case retried, the petitioner submits himself anew to the trial judge's discretion in sentencing him. Other courts have reached the same
result by emphasizing the status of the first trial. Specifically, after
the petitioner has received habeas corpus relief the first trial is
characterized as a nullity, and, is therefore void of legal effect.'
Consequently, it is argued that the original trial cannot impose
any limitations upon the actions taken by the sentencing judge in
a second proceeding.'
The decision in the principal case was not predicated upon legal
theories like the waiver and nullity doctrines. Rather, the court in
this case forthrightly examines the role of the sentencing judge.
Yet, before such an examination can be made, the court in Shear
has to assume the constitutionality of imposing a harsher sentence
on the successful habeas corpus applicant. But, it is this assumption
of constitutionality that is being most seriously challenged by the
more recent decisions which have confronted the problem.'
The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit in Patton
v. North Carolina6 ruled that it would be unconstitutional, under
any circumstances, to give the successful habeas corpus applicant
a longer sentence after his second trial. Generally, the court advanced three constitutional arguments to substantiate its decision.
First, due process of law guaranteed by the United States Constitution demands that one's right to contest an erroneous convic2 Trono v. United States, 199 U.S. 521 (1905); State v. Terreso, 56 Kan.
126, 42 P. 354 (1895). Contra, United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428, 431
(4th Cir. 1965). But cf. Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965);
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
3 Hobbs v. State, 231 Md. 533, 191 A.2d 238 (1963), cert. denied, 375
U.S. 914 (1963); af. James v. United States, 348 F.2d 430 (10th Cir. 1965);
State v. White, 262 N.C. 52, 136 S.E.2d 205 (1964).
4 Characterizing
as a nullity the original trial of the successful habeas
corpus applicant is founded upon the nature of the habeas corpus writ. For
a discussion of the nature of a habeas corpus writ as well as its differentiation
from 5direct appeal see Ex parte Evans, 42 W. Va. 242, 24 S.E. 888 (1896).
Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967); Marano v.
United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967).
6381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967).
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tion should not be thwarted by the possibility of receiving a more
severe punishment! Secondly, since those persons who contest
their previous convictions would be the only individuals subjected
to the risk of receiving a longer sentence, they would be denied
equal protection of the laws as contemplated by the Constitution.
Finally, the court concluded that had it not found constitutional
deprivations relative to due process and equal protection, the same
result would have been reached since a multiple punishment theory
of double jeopardy would preclude the imposition of a harsher
sentence.
Seemingly the genesis for these theories characterizing the possibility of increased sentences as fettering one's right to contest
an erroneous conviction is found in a dissenting opinion of Mr.
Justice Holmes.8 The United States Supreme Court's opinion in
Green v. United States,9 declaring unconstitutional a subsequent
conviction of a higher offense after direct appeal, added incentive
to the due process of law arguments concerning the imposition of
a harsher penalty. Significantly, however, the majority opinion in
Green distinguished the question of more severe punishment from
the degree of the particular offense.'0 But, it has been pointed out
that Green would proscribe the imposition of a harsher penalty,
"procedural logic notwithstanding.""
Implicit in the rationale advanced by those courts favoring complete prohibition of harsher sentences is a concern, not so much
for the particular individual already convicted and sentenced for
the second time, but for the many individuals still imprisoned who
have yet to test their first convictions. For example, the Patton
7 For a discussion of the unconstitutionality of conditioning the right of
a petitioner to contest an erroneous conviction see Van Alstyne, In Gideon's
Wake: Harsher Penalties and the "Successful" Criminal Appellant, 74 YALE
L.J. 606 (1965); Note, Unconstitutional Conditions, 73 HAMv. L. REv. 1595

(1960).

1 Kepner v. United States, 195 U.S. 100, 134 (1904) (dissenting opinion).

9355 U.S. 184 (1957).

'0 Stroud v. United States, 251 U.S. 15 (1919),
which upheld the
constitutionality of imposing a harsher sentence after appeal, was distinguished
in Green v. United States, 355 U.S. 184 n.15 (1957). But, Justice Frankfurter
dissenting in Green v. United States, supra, said at 213:
As a practical matter, and on any basis of human values, it is
scarcely possible to distinguish a case in which the defendant is
convicted of a greater offense from one in which he is convicted
of an offense that has the same name as that of which he was previously convicted but carries a significantly different punishment....
"United States v. Walker, 346 F.2d 428, 430 (4th Cir. 1965); accord,
People v. Henderson, 60 Cal.2d 482, 386 P.2d 677 (1963).
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court fears most the situation where one hesitates to exercise his
right to petition for habeas corpus. 2 But, such fear is obviously
unfounded as regards the person who has already brought himself
before the court for a second time. Thus, the Patton court is most
concerned with preserving the appearance of justice so that others
presently incarcerated will freely seek review of their first convictions. In contrast to this, the court in Shear v. Boles"3 would
sacrifice the appearance of justice so that the diginity of the trial
judge would not be invaded by a federal habeas corpus court.
Thus, the objectives, so far as due process of law is concerned,
of the Patton and Shear decisions are diametrically opposed. While
Patton adopts a rule that would extend constitutional protections
to all possible habeas corpus applicants, Shear examines each case
as it arises. To effectuate its objectives, the Patton court advocates
an absolute prohibition on inflicting harsher penalties. The court
in Shear sets up certain standards to evaluate sentencing judges'
actions. The Patton decision looks to the two ends of the postconviction spectrum-the more harshly sentenced individual at one
end, and the hesitant prisoner who observes the results of another's
appeal at the other. The Shear court scrutinizes the second trial,
conviction and sentencing process.
As noted above, the court in Shear advances certain standards
to be used in evaluating the sentencing judge's decision to impose
a harsher penalty. One is to consider: the length of the second
sentence; manifestations of a hostile attitude by the sentencing
judge; social, business, and/or family relationship of the second
sentencing judge to the first; and whether the second sentence
was imposed by the same judge who gave the original sentence. No one of the four standards is to be controlling, "Rather,
all the criteria must be looked at in toto and a determination made,
giving to each [of the four standards] its due weight." 4 Which of
the standards should be given more consideration so as to effectuate
the instruction to credit each with its "due weight" is not disclosed.
The harsh truth of the matter is that certain individuals will not
seek habeas corpus relief because they fear a more severe punishment. To suppose otherwise would be most naive. It would be
12 The court in Patton succinctly states, "North Carolina deprives the
accused of the constitutional right of a fair trial, then dares him to assert his
right by threatening him with the risk of a longer sentence." Patton v. North
Carolina, 381 F.2d 636, 640 (4th Cir. 1967).
13 263 F. Supp. 855 (N.D. W. Va. 1967).
14 Id. at 861.
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equally naive to suppose that a prisoner's fears are confined to
the possible retributive motives of a sentencing judge. More particularly, the prisoner must consider the possibility of receiving a
harsher penalty not only because a particular judge could act with
improper motives, but also the very fact that a second conviction
may produce a longer sentence than the one he is presently serving.
The Shear court recognizes that, "The threat of harsher sentences on
successful habeas corpus applicants certainly can become a tool
by which to prevent state or federal prisoners from seeldng redress of Constitutional deprivations previously suffered."' 5 But, the
Shear decision does not preclude relief for an individual obstensibly
aggrieved by a harsher punishment after the second trial. That is,
the particular defendant may still have judicial review of his case
in order to determine the propriety of the sentencing judge's
actions.
Since the circuit courts of appeals are evenly split over the constitutionally of imposing a harsher penalty on a successful habeas
corpus applicant,' 6 the United States Supreme Court may move
to resolve the issue. Until that decision is rendered, Shear v. Boles
stands as an attempt to reconcile the exigencies of federalism with
the demands for individual rights.
Thomas Ryan Goodwin

Wills-Ademption of Specific Legacies
T executed a will devising a lot and store building to an orphange. Subsequently T became incompetent and a trustee under
court order sold the specific realty to acquire funds for the maintenance of T. A portion of the funds were still held by the trustee
at T's death. The executor of T's estate petitioned the court for
construction of T's will and instructions in the administration of
T's estate. The trial court held that the sale of the lot and store
15 Id. at 864.
16 United States v. Whbite, 36 U.S.L.W.
2082 (U.S. 1967); Starner v.
Russell, 378 F.2d 808 (3rd Cir. 1967), both uphold the imposition of a harsher
penalty. Contra, Patton v. North Carolina, 381 F.2d 636 (4th Cir. 1967);
Marano v. United States, 374 F.2d 583 (1st Cir. 1967). It is to be noted that
the court in Marano v. United States, supra, would allow the exceptional step
of increasing the sentence of the successful habeas corpus applicant if there
were sufficient grounds contained in a new pre-sentence report and these
grounds had been affirmatively revealed.
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